TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/040891/0408001.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 3.6 KB | 82 lines

                                                                                WORLD, Page 38

THE POLITICAL INTEREST

A Changing of the Guard


By Michael Kramer


    As thousands of Soviet dissenters march against Mikhail
Gorbachev's rule, the West's message reflects a studied
neutrality: do what you must, internally, but continue your
cooperative and nonthreatening foreign policy. "We have
privately told Gorbachev that what he is doing at home is a
mistake," says a senior Bush Administration official, "but our
own national interest demands only that he continue his new
thinking abroad."

    There is little to argue with here. Railing against
something you can do nothing about may be morally satisfying,
but it can be strategically foolish.

    What happens, though, if the forces that have combined to
steer Gorbachev toward conservatism at home conspire to revive
old thinking abroad? Washington may soon know. Barring a
last-minute change, Gorbachev's fourth ambassador to the U.S.
in six years will be Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Komplektov,
59, a fluent English speaker and classic old-school hard-liner.
A Carter Administration aide who negotiated a fair amount of
SALT II with Komplektov describes him as "having spent many
years developing a reputation for calculated nastiness. He was
charming enough when it suited his purposes, but across the
table it was like pulling teeth. Viktor's idea of negotiating
is to offer you a choice between your mortgage and your
daughter."

    During Eduard Shevardnadze's tenure as Foreign Minister,
Komplektov oversaw Latin American affairs. By design, he had
little substantive power -- which was lucky for both superpowers
since each knew that improving their relations generally
required easing their rivalry in Central America.

    Komplektov's doctrinal rigidity was amply demonstrated on
June 20, 1989, at the first and only Central America
negotiating session he attended with Bush Administration
representatives. For almost two hours, Komplektov did little but
rehash old Soviet positions while lecturing Assistant Secretary
of State Bernard Aronson about the sensibilities of small Latin
nations condemned by geography to live in Washington's shadow.
Key U.S. and Kremlin aides agree that the subsequent
Soviet-American cooperation that resulted in Nicaragua's first
free elections would never have been possible if Komplektov had
controlled the talks that followed.

    Is Komplektov's posting to Washington an unambiguous bad
omen? "It isn't good," admits a Soviet Foreign Ministry
official. "If Gorbachev were in complete control, if he didn't
have to worry about the conservatives' power, Komplektov
probably would have been retired by now."

    The CIA offers a counterview. "The intelligence community
still believes that ((Foreign Minister Alexander)) Bessmertnykh
thinks like Shevardnadze, and that he is calling the important
shots," says an aide to Secretary of State James Baker. "Their
view is that Bessmertnykh has his own line of communication to
Baker and that Komplektov's well-known tough views mean that he
will be a figurehead ambassador only. The theory is that
Bessmertnykh and Gorbachev have cleverly thrown a bone to the
conservatives, and that Komplektov can do less damage in
Washington than in the Foreign Ministry in Moscow."

    Reminded that arms-control talks are once again stalled,
and that Moscow appeared to be undermining Bush's gulf policy
before the ground war began, this official paused only a moment
when asked which view seemed more credible at State: "The
Soviets'," he said. "Obviously."